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This case involves a dis-
pute over environmental
cleanup costs incurred at
four aircraft engine main-
tenance facilities in
Texas. A successor prop-
erty owner. Aviall
Services. Inc.. is seeking
to recover an equitable
share of its cleanup costs
from the property's prior
owner. Cooper Industries.
Inc. The parties disagree
as to whether Aviall can
use Superfund for this
purpose even though it
cleaned up its property
voluntarily. after consul-
tations with Texas state
officials. without first liti-
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Cooper Industries, Inc., a firm that
owned and operated several aircraft
engine maintenance facilities in
Texas, in 1981 sold the facilities to
Aviall Services, Inc. Aviall continued
to operate those facilities and,
beginning in 1984 and for about a
decade thereafter, performed an
environmental cleanup of improper-
ly disposed hazardous substances
language in § ID(f) seems to allow
the suit without a prior EPA action,
especially when read in conjunction
with the scope of liability created hv
CERCLA § 107. Courts around the'
nation have been struggling with
this issue for more than a decade.
ISSUE
Can a responsible party bring an
action for contribution under
§ 113(0 of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act in
the absence of a prior or pending
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When "Responsible Parties" Clean Up Voluntarily,
Can They Use Superfund to Get Some of
Their Cleanup Costs Back?
by Robert H. Abrams and Amy Kullenberg
This case turns on a nuanced inter-
pretive issue involving § 113(0 of
the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA, aka
Superfund). Superfund's main liabil-
ity section, § 107, allows (among
other things) private parties who
have cleaned up sites to sue "poten-
tially responsible parties" (PRPs) to
recover cleanup costs incurred con-
sistent with the cleanup standards
established by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). Section 113(f) of Superfund
expressly authorizes PRPs who have
paid all or a disproportionately large
amount of cleanup costs to sue oth-
er PRPs to contribute to these pay-
ments. Textually, § 113({) is not the
epitome of unambiguous drafting.
Some language suggests that to use
the section a PRP must first have
been subject to a suit or a cleanup
proceeding initiated by EPA. Other
that cost roughly $5 million. Aviall
contacted Texas authorities about
the matter and, under threat of
state administrative order, cleaned
up the property in a manner satis-
factory to the Texas authorities.
Aviall did not contact the United
States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). In 1995 and 1996,
Aviall sold those facilities but
retained responsibility for the envi-
ronmental conditions. In 1997,
Aviall filed a lawsuit in the United
States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas against
Cooper to recover the cleanup costs
it had expended. The suit lodged
claims on several grounds, including
two distinct federal claims based on
Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and
Liability Act, and additional state
law claims.
The first Superfund claim arose
under § 107(a)(2), with Aviall pro-
ceeding as a person who had
cleaned up consistent with federal
standards and now sought to recov-
er those costs from Cooper
Industries as an owner of the facility
at the time hazardous substances
were released. The second claim
arose under § 113(f) and sought
contribution as a party that had
been itself partially responsible for
the release but had paid more than
its appropriate share of the cost of
cleanup. Early in the litigation,
Aviall amended its complaint
regarding the two federal claims and
merged them into a single claim in
accordance with the prevailing Fifth
Circuit precedent that interprets a
claim of this nature as arising joint-
ly under §§ 107 and 11J(f). See
Geraghty & Miller, Inc. 'V. Conoco,
Inc., 23-1 F.3d 917 (2000). At that
point, Cooper sought and obtained
summary judgment on the unified
claim, which was accompanied by
dismissal of the state law claims on
the grounds that the court would
decline to exercise its supplemental
jurisdiction now that no federal
claims remained present. In 2001, a
divided panel of the United States
Circuit Court for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the ruling; however, after
an en banc hearing in 2002, a divid-
ed Fifth Circuit reversed and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
CASE ANALYSIS
This is a case of statutory interpre-
tation. The difficult language




Any person may seek contribu-
tion from any other person who
is liable or potentially liable
under section [107(a)] of this
title, during or following any civil
action under section [106] of this
title or section [107(a)] of this
title. Nothing in this subsec-
tion shall diminish the right of
any person to bring an action for
contribution in the absence of a
civil action under section [106]
of this title or section [107] of
this title.
It does not take a great deal of legal
sophistication to see that the first
and last sentences of § 113(f)(1) can
be read to express radically different
views about the necessity of a § 106
or § 107 action as a prerequisite to
recovery under § 113(t). The
Petitioners in this case stress the
point that the first sentence is the
one creating the express federal
remedy-a contribution action in
federal court-and that that sen-
tence, therefore, defines the entire
permissible scope of the cause of
action. The inescapable thrust of the
arguments of Petitioners, and of the
United States on their behalf, is that
the text of the first line, which
reads, "may seek contribution
during or following any civil action
under section [106] of this title or
section [107(a)] of this title" really
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means that parties "may only seek
contribution . during or following
any civil action under section [106]
of this title or section [107(a)] of
this title." See, e.g., Brief of United
States, Statement of Argument.
Petitioners then go on beyond textu-
alism to try to show that their prof-
fered interpretation is consistent
with the larger scheme of CERCLA.
Respondents hotly contest that
reading, both in regard to its fidelity
to the text and in regard to its con-
sistency with the statute as a whole.
Their central textual arguments
attack the transformation of the
permissive "may" into a restrictive
"may only." This line of argument
was a central point in the en bane
decision of the Fifth Circuit in favor
of Aviall. Respondents argue further
that the savings clause in the last
sentence of § 113(f) couldn't be
clearer in demonstrating that a
prior § 106 or § 107 civil action is
not a prerequisite to recovery. This
argument gains considerable extra
traction in the real-world practices
surrounding the operation of
CERCLA. Section 106 allows EPA
the power to file a civil action to
enforce its administrative orders,
but the parties receiving them com-
ply with most such orders and many
do not result in the filing of civil
actions that would reduce the agree-
ment to a consent decree. There has
never been any doubt (or legal chal-
lenge) to the right of a recipient of a
§ 106 order who complies and
expends cleanup costs in that con-
text to seek a § 113(f) contribution.
For Respondents, the more subtle
problem is to find a useful meaning
for the "during or after" language of
the first sentence of § 113(f). They
are impelled to argue that the con-
tested language in the first sentence
is simply permissive-§ 113(f) suits
"may" be brought at those times, as
well as at any other time. That
being the case, and in light of the
Issue No.1
broad savings language of the last
sentence, the interpretive issue for
them is to explain why the "during
or after" language is in the first sen-
tence at all. Here they are running
into a somewhat dubious presump-
tion that may impute too much
rationality to the legislative process:
a frequently invoked canon of statu-
tory interpretation is that every
word chosen by the legislature must
be given meaning.
SIGNIFICANCE
To repeat, this is a case of statutory
interpretation. Moreover, it is not a
case in which the different possible
interpretations carry great prospec-
tive consequences in the overall
operation of CERCLA. On a practi-
cal, pragmatic level, however, the
case has a small marginal impact on
several aspects of Superfund's oper-
ation. A victory by Aviall allowing
its § 113(f) suit to go forward would
very slightly increase the attractive-
ness of voluntary cleanups. But at
this time, a whole host of other
incentives to undertake such
actions have been put in place
under other legislation, such as the
Brownfields Revitalization Act. A
decision for Cooper would force
Aviall to seek to recover from
Cooper under state-law theories and
would have the indirect conse-
quence of increasing the bargaining
power of EPA in its dealings with
PRPs who are in a position to
undertake voluntary cleanups. It
could also unsettle the law of
CERCLA § 106 cases in which no
civil action is filed. That is impor-
tant inasmuch as many cases that
do involve EPA do not result in a
civil filing. If Cooper prevails in this
case, parties thinking about volun-
tary cleanups but need the benefits
of CERCLA § 113(f) to spread a por-
tion of the cost to other PRPs will
be forced first to negotiate a consent
decree with EPA that is lodged with
the court as part of a "civil action"
under § 106 or § 107. This gives
American Bar Association
EPA leverage, but it is far from clear
that EPA any longer wants to
become involved in many of these
cases. The end result, whichever
way it goes, can be altered by
Congress in a quick flick of the leg-
islative pen, and the topic is not one
that will raise much of a cry on
either side of the aisle or any other
evident political divide.
The case has a little bit more signifi-
cance as an example of the philo-
sophical debate about textualism in
statutory interpretation. Cooper
Industries, with William Bradford
Reynolds as lead counsel, claims
that its textual reading is more true
to the text than the textual argu-
ment urged by Aviall Services that
won acceptance by the en bane
majority of the Fifth Circuit. That
view has just recently gained the
support of the Bush II
Administration, which has altered
the position taken previously by EPA
throughout the nearly two decades
since the passage of § 113(f). Viewed
with that context in mind, the case
might playa role in a larger debate
about textualism and provide the
Supreme Court with an opportunity
to come down on the side of greater
literalism. Oddly, if Cooper wins, the
victory's federalism consequences
(empowering EPA and injecting it as
a necessary player in what are
increasingly becoming state-private
party negotiated settlements) seem
to be at cross purposes with the nor-
mal federalism desires of this
Administration and its ideological
partners.
A more significant aspect of the case
inheres in the mere fact that the
Supreme Court is going to decide
the issue. Clearing up the ambiguity
will prevent more litigation of an
issue that has soaked up significant
amounts of judicial time and litigant
dollars in tens, if not hundreds of
cases over the years. Superfund has
been harshly criticized for its high
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transaction costs, and every decision
that ends litigation that does not
advance the merits is salutary. This
too, however, is somewhat ironic
because the timing of the decision-
coming after Superfund is well past
its zenith-minimizes its impor-
tance. State-supervised voluntary
cleanups at contaminated sites are
now the principal rubric under
which cleanups at unremediated
sites are being proposed. EPA, with
most of the worst sites now moving
along in the remedial process, has
become almost quiescent in relation
to using Superfund at additional
sites. Thus, to decide this case now
rather than 15 years ago is almost
beside the point because so few sig-
nificant cases involving the behav-
iors that are influenced by this deci-
sion are still taking place.
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